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SYMPOSIA
What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed
Insider Trading?
JOHN P. ANDERSON*
There is growing support for the claim that issuer-licensed insider
trading (when the insider’s firm approves the trade in advance and
has disclosed that it permits such trading pursuant to published
guidelines) is economically efficient and morally harmless. But for
the last thirty-five years, many scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court
have relied on Professor William Wang’s “Law of Conservation of
Securities” to rebut claims that insider trading can be victimless.
This law is purported to show that every act of insider trading, even
those licensed by the issuer, causes an identifiable harm to someone.
This article argues that the Law of Conservation of Securities is not
helpful to answering the moral question of whether insider trading is
a victimless crime because it either proves too much or too little. It
either proves that all profitable trades (or profitable trade omissions)
in advance of firms’ material disclosures are morally impermissible
(an absurdity), or it tells us nothing at all about the moral permissi-
bility of such trades. Of course, once the Law of Conservation of
Securities is neutralized, other moral criticisms of issuer-licensed
insider trading that rely on this law also fail. Professor Leo Katz’s
claim that morality does not permit one to consent to a system that
openly allows issuer-licensed insider trading is offered as one exam-
ple of an argument that fails once considered in light of a proper
understanding of the Law of Conservation of Securities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have argued elsewhere that insider trading is morally harmless
where the issuer approves the trade in advance and has disclosed that it
permits such trading pursuant to published guidelines.1 I have also sug-
gested that reforming the law to permit such issuer-licensed insider trad-
ing “would result in a more rational, efficient, and just insider trading
enforcement regime.”2 A common objection to my claim that issuer-
licensed insider trading is harmless is that this argument fails to account
for Professor William K.S. Wang’s “Law of Conservation of Securi-
ties.”3 According to Professor Wang and others,4 the Law of Conserva-
tion of Securities proves that each act of insider trading inflicts harm on
some definite victim, regardless of whether the trade was approved by
the issuer.5
In what follows, I will show that the Law of the Conservation of
Securities is not helpful to a moral analysis of insider trading because it
either proves that all profitable trades (or profitable omissions) in
advance of a material disclosure are morally impermissible (an absur-
dity), or it tells us nothing at all about the moral permissibility of such
trades.6 Of course, once the Law of Conservation of Securities is neu-
1. See John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 1, 27–43 (2014) [hereinafter Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading].
2. See John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From Trading
Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 380 (2015) [hereinafter Anderson,
Anticipating a Sea Change].
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3.3.5 (3d ed.
2010); William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
1217, 1234–35 (1981) [hereinafter Wang, Material Nonpublic Information]; William K.S. Wang,
Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud
in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 27–41, 63–65 (2000)
[hereinafter Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading].
4. See, e.g., Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for
Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 120 n.107, 123 nn.122–24 (1984);
Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 948 (2014)
(“William Wang has provided a compelling articulation of what the harm [of insider trading] is
and who the victims are.”). See also infra note 42.
5. See Wang, Material Nonpublic Information, supra note 3, at 1234–35; Wang, Stock R
Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 29 (observing that when an insider makes a purchase or R
sale prior to the public disclosure of a material event, some unidentified member of the public has
either more or less shares at the time of the disclosure than they otherwise would have, and “[t]hat
someone is worse off because of the insider trade”).
6. Cf. Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 37 (noting that some R
arguments regarding the morality of insider trading focus on the fact that it is illegal, and arguing
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tralized, other moral criticisms of issuer-licensed insider trading that rely
upon this law also fail. Professor Leo Katz’s argument that morality
does not permit one to consent to a system that openly allows issuer-
licensed insider trading offers one example.7 I conclude by explaining
why Professor Katz’s challenge to issuer-licensed insider trading fails
when considered in light of a proper understanding of the Law of Con-
servation of Securities. But first, I shall briefly summarize my principal
arguments for why issuer-licensed insider trading is morally harmless
and should not be criminalized.8
II. WHY THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH ISSUER-LICENSED
INSIDER TRADING
In analyzing the morality of insider trading, it is crucial to first
posit a legal regime that does not proscribe any form of insider trading.
This ensures that the moral permissibility of insider trading can be tested
independent of any social expectations arising solely from the fact that
the conduct is illegal.9 Next, it is helpful to divide the conduct currently
proscribed in the United States under the classical theory of insider trad-
ing10 into two subcategories of trading that would be permitted under
this posited regime—“issuer-proscribed” and “issuer-licensed” insider
trading. In the United States, a corporate insider incurs insider trading
liability if she seeks to benefit by trading (or tipping others who trade) in
that the legality of insider trading is not the proper focus point for discussing the morality of
insider trading).
7. See generally Leo Katz, Crime, Consent, and Insider Trading, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 217 (1994).
8. For a more complete exposition of these arguments, see Anderson, Criminalization of
Insider Trading, supra note 1. R
9. Some have argued that the wrong in insider trading can be traced to the fact that it violates
established market regulations. For example, Professor Stuart Green has suggested that insider
trading is wrongful because it cheats the established regulatory system. The insider breaks the
preestablished rules of the cooperative scheme in order to take advantage of others’ compliance.
STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 235–40 (2006). Such arguments are not helpful when the question posed is whether insider
trading should be regulated in the first place. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading,
supra note 1, at 27. By positing a regime that does not proscribe insider trading, we avoid this R
problem.
10. The current insider-trading jurisprudence has divided insider-trading liability under
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), into two
broad theories: the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. See United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). The misappropriation theory applies to corporate
outsiders. A corporate outsider incurs misappropriation liability when she improperly obtains
material nonpublic information and, unbeknownst to the source, seeks to benefit by trading (or by
tipping others who trade) on this information. See id. at 652. There is no need to discuss the
misappropriation theory further here because the focus of this article is on trading by true insiders.
For a discussion of the classical theory, see Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra
note 1, at 18–20. R
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shares of her own company based on material nonpublic information.11
The following analysis distinguishes this conduct still further based on
whether the issuer has approved the trading or whether the issuer has not
approved the trading:
Issuer-proscribed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpub-
lic information [despite the fact] that the insider has promised—or
otherwise undertaken pursuant to company policy (express or
implied)—not to trade on such information.12
Issuer-licensed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpublic
information with the firm’s approval. (It is presumed that the issuer’s
policy allowing insider trading is disclosed to the investing public.)13
The following arguments demonstrate that issuer-proscribed insider
trading is morally harmful and would not be permitted under either utili-
tarian or deontological moral theories, while issuer-licensed insider trad-
ing is morally harmless and, therefore, permissible under both of these
theories.14
Utilitarianism identifies the rightness or wrongness of an act by its
results. When the question is whether a type of conduct—such as issuer-
proscribed insider trading—should be criminalized, then the utilitarian
typically asks if, all things being equal, universal compliance with a rule
proscribing the relevant conduct would yield as good or better a state of
affairs than a rule permitting that conduct.15 This calculus must, of
course, include the costs of enforcement and compliance.16 If a rule pro-
scribing the conduct would yield a better state of affairs, then the utili-
tarian concludes that morality dictates criminalization of the conduct.17
The consequences of insider trading continue to be hotly debated.18
Those who suggest that insider trading results in a net benefit to society
typically argue that it increases price accuracy,19 provides real-time
11. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
12. See Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 2, at 379. R
13. See id. (manuscript at 76–77); see also Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading,
supra note 1, at 27–28. R
14. The following analysis is limited to testing issuer-licensed insider trading under the moral
theories of utilitarianism and deontology because these are the two principal moral theories
informing Anglo-American jurisprudence. For a broader treatment (which assesses insider trading
through the lens of virtue theory as well), see Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra
note 1, at 27–54. R
15. This is the principle of rule utilitarianism. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM FOR & AGAINST 9 (1973) (“Rule-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule
that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.”).
16. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 31–32.
17. See id. at 31–32.
18. See id. at 7–17.
19. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
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information to the markets,20 has a market-smoothing effect,21 and offers
an efficient means of compensation.22 Those who argue insider trading
imposes a net harm to society typically claim that it increases the bid-ask
spread set by market makers23 and that it undermines investor confi-
dence in the markets24 (both of which in turn increase the cost of capital
to firms).25
Interestingly, by giving separate treatment to issuer-proscribed and
issuer-licensed insider trading, the utilitarian’s question seems to answer
itself. For we can assume that, in making the determination of whether
to license insider trading in any given instance, the issuer will weigh the
potential costs against the potential benefits to the firm. If the issuer
determines that the costs will outweigh the benefits under the circum-
stances, then the issuer will not license the trading (and vice versa). If
insiders were permitted to trade despite the issuer’s prohibition, then a
net cost to issuers would be expected. In addition, permitting such trad-
ing “would undermine the [socially beneficial] practice of promise mak-
ing in the corporate context” (and in general).26 These considerations are
decisive in condemning issuer-proscribed insider trading and warranting
its criminalization (or at least its regulation).27
But these considerations are just as decisive in favor of adopting a
rule that permits issuer-licensed insider trading under the utilitarian
framework. For where insider trading is issuer-licensed, the firm’s own
calculus reflects that such trading will result in a net benefit for the firm.
STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983) (“If insiders trade, the share price will move closer to what it
would have been had the information been disclosed.”).
20. See, e.g., id. (“Through insider trading, a firm can convey information it could not
feasibly announce publicly because an announcement would destroy the value of the information,
would be too expensive, not believable, or—owing to the uncertainty of the information—would
subject the firm to massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be incorrect.”); see also
Henry Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2003), http://people.wku.edu/
indudeep.chhachhi/519files/519hout/Instr0303.pdf; Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading,
supra note 1, at 14–15. R
21. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV.
547, 574 (1970); see also Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 15.
22. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Entrepreneurship, Compensation, and the Corporation, 14
Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 17–18 (2011); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 19, at 861–66; see also
Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 16–17.
23. See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 100–05 (2004); see
also Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 9–12. R
24. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although informational
disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their
capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked
by law.”).
25. See Dolgopolov, supra note 23, at 100–01.
26. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 29.
27. See id. at 29–30.
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Moreover, such trading does not generate any of the disutility associated
with the breaking of a promise.28 Additionally, to the extent issuer-
licensed insider trading would benefit the firm (and therefore its share-
holders), the practice should reinforce confidence in the markets rather
than undermine it.29
Deontological moral theory is duty-based.30 As such, the deontolo-
gist does not judge the moral quality of an act by the goodness or bad-
ness of its consequences (as the utilitarian would), but by the motive
behind the act, and whether that motive complies with moral law. Deon-
tology is often described as absolutist because it holds that there are
certain things one should never do, “though the heavens fall.”31 In the
debate over whether insider trading should be criminalized, it is often
suggested that even if the overall consequences of insider trading are
beneficial to the markets and society as a whole, it should nevertheless
be criminalized because “it’s just not right!”32 Such objections are
driven by deontological intuitions.
Perhaps the most recognized articulation of a deontological moral
theory is found in the “end-in-oneself” formulation of Immanuel Kant’s
categorical imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity . . . always as an
end and never as a means only.”33 In other words, one should never use
others for purposes they themselves would reject.
One need not look further than the promise the insider makes not to
trade on the firm’s material nonpublic information to conclude that
issuer-proscribed insider trading violates Kant’s categorical imperative.
Such trading necessarily treats the promisee (the firm) solely as the
means to an end (use of the company’s material nonpublic information
for trading profits) that the promisee has expressly rejected.34 If an
28. Id. at 30–31. The argument is only made stronger when the significant costs that are
incurred by issuers in order to comply with insider trading regulations are taken into account. See
generally Joan Macleod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1172–80 (2003); see also John P. Anderson, Solving the
Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586185 [hereinafter Anderson, Paradox of Insider
Trading Compliance].
29. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 41–42.
30. In fact the word “deontology” finds its origins in the Greek words deon (duty) and logos
(the science of). PETER A. ANGELES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 60 (1981).
31. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972).
32. I am reminded of Henry Manne’s frequently-cited example of a student who objected to
his economic justification for the legalization of insider trading by stomping her foot and saying
“it’s just not right!” HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 15 n.42
(1966).
33. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (Lewis White Beck
trans., 2d ed. 1990).
34. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 35. R
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issuer publicly affirms that it does not allow its insiders to trade on
material nonpublic information, then issuer-proscribed insider trading
also treats other traders in that firm’s shares as mere means because they
have presumably priced its shares based on the expectation that such
trading is not permitted.35
The moral landscape is dramatically different, however, when one
engages in issuer-licensed insider trading. Such trading does not deceive
or violate a promise to the firm; indeed, the firm has licensed the trade.
And there is no deception of others who trade in the firm’s shares
because the issuer has disclosed that it allows its employees to trade
based on material nonpublic information when it is in the firm’s interest
to do so. As a result of this disclosure, market participants are free to
demand a correspondingly lower price for the issuer’s shares or to refuse
to trade in the firm’s stock altogether.36 If they choose to trade in the
firm’s shares at market price, they do so with the understanding that
their counterparty may have an information advantage.37 All interested
parties to the issuer-licensed insider’s trading are therefore “treated
as . . . ‘end[s]-in-themselves’ and not as . . . mere means.”38
For these reasons (and others too lengthy to develop here39), I am
convinced that issuer-licensed insider trading within the parameters
defined above is morally harmless, victimless, and should not therefore
be criminalized. But have I missed something? Professor Wang argues
that the Law of Conservation of Securities proves that even issuer-
licensed insider trading has victims.40 And Professor Katz suggests that
any defense of issuer-licensed insider trading is a non-starter because the
market participants’ right against insider trading is inalienable.41 In what
35. See id. at 35; see also Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 2, at 385. R
36. See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1491, 1515–20 (1999) (arguing that disclosure of general intent to allow trading on the firm’s
material nonpublic information is sufficient to avoid deception); see also Anderson,
Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 36–40. R
37. See Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 39–40. R
38. Id. at 40.
39. See id. at 40–54 (offering arguments based on considerations of fairness and virtue theory
that provide further support for the conclusion that issuer-licensed insider trading should not be
criminalized); see also Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 2, at 388 (suggesting that R
legalization of issuer-licensed insider trading can “improve the current [insider] trading
enforcement regime in terms of justice, clarity, efficiency, and coherence”); Anderson, Paradox of
Insider Trading Compliance, supra note 28 (suggesting that legalization of issuer-licensed insider R
trading would lead to increased shareholder value by significantly reducing compliance and other
related costs).
40. See Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 29 (“[E]ach act of stock market R
insider trading has specific victims.”). According to Professor Wang, the “victims are those who
would be better off, but for the act of insider trading,” as opposed to the “nondisclosure” that
accompanies the insider trade. See id.
41. See Katz, supra note 7, at 226. R
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remains, I explain why these claims are mistaken.
III. INSIDER TRADING HARM AND THE LAW OF
CONSERVATION OF SECURITIES
In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court relied on a fre-
quently cited argument by Professor Wang to support the claim that
every act of insider trading causes an identifiable harm to someone.42
The argument proceeds as follows.
If an insider trader purchases shares based on material nonpublic
information, then she will have more of the relevant issuer’s shares at
the time the information is disseminated. Consequently, assuming the
number of that issuer’s outstanding shares remains constant,43 someone
else must have fewer shares at the time of dissemination.44 Those who
have fewer shares at the time of dissemination were either induced (to
sell) or preempted (from buying) by the insider’s trading.45 These indi-
viduals were therefore made worse off as a result of the insider’s trade.46
If an insider sells shares on the basis of material nonpublic information,
then someone else (the induced buyer or the preempted seller) ends up
with more shares at the time of dissemination and is thereby made worse
off.47 “Paraphrasing the law of conservation of mass-energy,” Professor
Wang refers to “this phenomenon [as] the [L]aw of [C]onservation of
[S]ecurities.”48
The Law of Conservation of Securities purports to demonstrate that
each act of insider trading has specific victims, those who “were either
preempted [from acting] or induced [to act] by the insider trading.”49
Professor Wang admits that, as a practical matter, the actual identity of
42. See 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997). In fact, the Court cites to Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 120–21 & n.107 (1984), but the cited language expressly relies on
Professor Wang’s argument in Material Nonpublic Information, supra note 3, at 1234–35. R
43. See Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 29. Note that Professor Wang’s R
argument does not depend on this assumption, but it simplifies its explication. See WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.8 (“The ‘Law of Conservation of Securities’ is easier to R
understand with th[is] . . . assumption[ ]. Relaxing [this assumption], however, does not alter the
conclusions.”).
44. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.8; see also Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, R
supra note 3, at 29. R
45. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.8; see also Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, R
supra note 3, at 29–30. R
46. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.6; see also Wang, Stock Market Insider R
Trading, supra note 3, at 29. R
47. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 29. R
48. Id.
49. Id. at 29–30.
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these “victims” can almost never be determined;50 but this does nothing
to diminish the fact that they exist.51
Thus, at a minimum, Professor Wang claims that the Law of Con-
servation of Securities disposes of the argument that insider trading
(like, say, marijuana or pornography use) should not be regulated
because it is a “victimless crime.”52 He freely admits that the mere fact
that insider trading has victims does not settle the question of how it
should be regulated.53 Nevertheless, he observes, “society is more likely
to regulate insider trading strictly if,” as the Law of the Conservation of
Securities demonstrates, “it has victims.”54
IV. WHY THE LAW OF CONSERVATION OF SECURITIES
PROVES TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE
It turns out that the Law of Conservation of Securities does nothing
to answer the question of whether insider trading is a “victimless crime.”
It either proves too much or nothing at all.
To begin, application of the Law of Conservation of Securities
finds a harm or victim in every profitable market trade in advance of a
material disclosure, not just those based on material nonpublic informa-
tion.55 Imagine Timmy, a college student, buys a new iPhone and loves
it so much that he decides to buy ten shares in Apple Inc. The next day,
Apple publicly introduces its much-anticipated iWatch. Shares in Apple
immediately climb fifteen percent. The Law of Conservation of Securi-
ties tells us that Timmy’s purchase of Apple shares harmed or victim-
ized whoever was induced to sell or preempted from buying as a result
of Timmy’s trade. But the resulting “harm” or “victimization” has no
moral import. It simply reflects the trivial truth that someone is always
50. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.7. To identify the victims of an insider trade, R
one would have to compare the universe in which the insider trade was made to the universe in
which it was not made. But “it is almost never possible to describe the universe that would have
existed had there been no insider trade.” Id. In some rare cases, however, one might be able to
identify the victim of an inside trade of a large block of shares. See id.
51. It should be noted, however, that the impact of insider trading will almost always be
minimal. As Stephen Bainbridge points out, “any gains siphoned off by insiders with respect to a
particular stock are likely to be an immaterial percentage of the gains contemporaneously earned
by the class of investors as a whole.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND
POLICY 197 (2014). For example, “[I]n Texas Gulf Sulphur, [401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),] trading
by insiders amounted to less than 10% of the trading activity in Texas Gulf Sulphur stock and, of
course, a vastly smaller percentage of trading activity in the class of securities with comparable
betas.” Id. at 197–98.
52. See Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 28. R
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id.
55. Recall that Professor Wang focuses on the act of the trade itself, and not the unequal
access to information. See supra note 40. R
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made worse off (in this limited sense) as a result of any profitable trade
prior to an unanticipated public announcement of material information.
Moreover, it is not just that the Law of Conservation of Securities
finds some harm in every profitable trade prior to an unanticipated mate-
rial disclosure; it identifies the same harm in every profitable trade omis-
sion.56 Continuing with the example above, every Apple shareholder at
the time of dissemination was, per the Law of Conservation of Securi-
ties, the but-for cause of harm to the persons who would have purchased
those shareholders’ stock had they sold prior to dissemination. Given
that there are about six billion outstanding shares of Apple,57 this
amounts to a significant amount of harms and victims.58
Professor Wang seems aware of this odd result, but he fails to
appreciate its significance for his thesis. He observes that “[c]learly,
society will not impose liability on traders who unknowingly, fortu-
itously make advantageous trades prior to public disclosure. Therefore,
causing harm under the law of conservation of securities is not sufficient
in itself to impose liability.”59 But this acknowledgment misses the
point. It is not just that the trivial “harm” identified by the Law of Con-
servation of Securities is not a sufficient condition for liability; once it is
understood that every profitable securities trade (or omission) in advance
of a material disclosure results in the same harm, it becomes clear that
this law is simply irrelevant when assessing the moral permissibility
of—or the appropriateness of imposing liability for—insider trading.
It does no good to suggest, as Professor Wang seems to,60 that the
Law of Conservation of Securities identifies the harm but that only
knowing or intentional inflictions of the harm are wrongful and therefore
worthy of regulation. For all unknowing traders—i.e., those who fail to
possess material nonpublic information—still trade with the clear intent
to inflict precisely the harm identified by the Law of Conservation of
Securities on others, which is only to say that they aim to profit by their
trades.61 And to claim that aiming to profit by trading is morally blame-
56. A logical consequence of the Law of Conservation of Securities’ but-for reasoning is that
profitable trading omissions (or abstentions) will always make someone worse off by relegating
whoever would have been the counterparty to the omitted trade to the sidelines. See Wang, Stock
Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 28–30.
57. See APPLE INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 24 (Oct. 27, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312514383437/d783162d10k.htm.
58. Of course it would likely send the stock price into free fall if all of these Apple
shareholders sold their holdings prior to dissemination. This does not, however, diminish the fact
that the Law of Conservation of Securities tells us that each such omission makes someone worse
off by relegating that person to the sidelines at the time the good news is disclosed. See Wang,
Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 28–30. R
59. Id. at 36.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 256 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
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worthy is to suggest that all (or virtually all) market participation is
wrongful.
In addition, even when an insider knowingly trades on material
nonpublic information, the Law of Conservation of Securities only tells
us that someone will be made worse off as a result of the trade, it does
not tell us who that person (or those persons) will be.62 The person made
worse off could be another insider trader who was preempted.63 Is the
preempted insider “harmed” or “victimized” in any morally relevant
sense of these terms? Certainly not. In fact, if we assume arguendo that
there is something inherently wrong with insider trading, then we must
conclude that this trade actually preempted the other insider from perpe-
trating a moral wrong. By analogy, there are many wrongs arguably
associated with smoking a joint, for example, but it has never been sug-
gested that smoking a joint is wrong because it prevented someone else
from smoking it. Consequently, even on Professor Wang’s own terms, it
cannot be said that his Law of Conservation of Securities demonstrates
that every act of insider trading harms some victim.
In light of these considerations, it is misleading to label the pre-
empted or induced traders identified by the Law of Conservation of
Securities as “victims” of insider trading. The preempted or induced
traders identified by that law are made worse off by all profitable trades
or omissions in advance of a material disclosure—regardless of whether
they are based on material nonpublic information. Moreover, virtually
every time someone trades (or chooses not to trade) on the open market,
they intend to inflict precisely this “harm” and create just such “vic-
tims.” For these and other reasons offered above, the induced or pre-
empted traders identified by the Law of Conservation of Securities are
not “victims” within the meaning of that term as availed by scholars in
the debate over whether insider trading is a victimless crime.64 At the
and dissenting in part) (noting that many investors trade precisely because they are of the opinion
that the stock price does not reflect the corporation’s actual worth); Donald C. Langevoort,
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 851, 852 n.6 (1992) (“Economists have long wondered about the efficiency paradox—that
the existence of a high degree of efficiency depends on a critical mass of persons believing that it
is worthwhile to try to beat the market, notwithstanding the model’s teachings.”); see also
Anderson, Criminalization of Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 37. R
62. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 3, § 3.3.7.
63. See id. § 3.3.6.
64. I have to think that Wang must be aware that his use of the term “victim” is something of
an equivocation. For example, contrast the “victims” or “harms” identified by the Law of
Conservation of Securities with the candidate harms Wang identifies in the debate over whether
pornography is victimless: e.g., that it “increases sex crimes” such as rape, or that it humiliates
and “undermines respect for women.” Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 28. R
Increasing sex crimes is socially detrimental conduct that, on its own, can distinguish morally
permissible conduct from morally impermissible conduct. Trading at a profit (and thereby denying
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end of the day, Professor Wang’s law fails to tell us anything about the
moral quality of an act of insider trading. Consequently, the Law of
Conservation of Securities fails to shed any light on the question of
whether issuer-licensed insider trading is a wrong that warrants
criminalization.65
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ISSUER-LICENSED INSIDER TRADING
The conclusion that the Law of Conservation of Securities is mor-
ally irrelevant can be employed to test other arguments that issuer-
licensed insider trading is morally impermissible. For example, Profes-
sor Leo Katz relies on Wang’s law to support his claim that persons
cannot consent to a system that openly permits issuer-licensed insider
trading.66
Professor Katz follows Professor Wang in identifying the “victims”
of insider trading as those who were induced or preempted by such trad-
ing.67 He argues that since, ceteris paribus, shareholders or potential
shareholders have a right not to be harmed or victimized, the question is
whether one’s right against such victimization can be traded or con-
tracted away. In other words, “[w]e generally think that you can consent
to a wrong and that it is no longer a wrong when you do. Consent to a
theft and it becomes a gift. Consent to a rape and it becomes plain
sex.”68 Can shareholders or potential shareholders consent (even if only
tacitly) to issuer-licensed insider trading and thereby cleanse it of any
moral blame? Professor Katz argues they cannot.
“[I]magine that [a] company, recognizing the economic benefits of
insider trading,”69 openly adopts a policy permitting its insiders to trade
where doing so is deemed beneficial to the firm. The company even
posts the following disclosure in all its advertisements and filings:
“THIS COMPANY BELIEVES IN LETTING ITS INSIDERS TRADE
ON THE BASIS OF INSIDE INFORMATION. IF THIS BOTHERS
someone else of the opportunity to trade at a profit) cannot, on its own, distinguish morally
permissible conduct from morally impermissible conduct.
65. Professor Bainbridge makes a similar point: “To justify a ban on insider trading, you need
a basis for asserting that it is inappropriate, undesirable, or immoral for those gains to be reaped
by insiders. The law of conservation of securities does not, standing alone, provide such a basis.”
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 51, at 198. R
66. See Katz, supra note 7, at 218. R
67. See id. (“After all, the insiders did get richer. That money must have come out of
somebody’s pocket—his victim’s. But whose pocket? Which victim? Well, if not the person who
sold the stock, then the person who would have bought the stock if the insider had not bought it.”).
68. Id. at 234.
69. Id. at 219.
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YOU, DON’T BUY OUR STOCK.”70 Professor Katz suggests that,
even with this disclosure, insider trading would be morally impermissi-
ble based on the following argument.
Relying on the Law of Conservation of Securities, Katz assumes
that (1) the harm done by insider trading is that it permits insiders to
profit at the expense of those who are preempted or induced by the
insider’s trade.71 (2) The victims of insider trading have a right not to be
harmed by such trades (and the state has a corresponding duty to protect
them against such harm).72 (3) Not every moral claim can be alienated or
exchanged for something else. For example, we all have a right to pro-
tection by the state from reckless and intentional assaults.73 The law
should not permit someone to waive that right in exchange for some
liquidated damages remedy (or some other benefit) because the state’s
duty is to protect its citizens from harm by assault, not to guarantee a
“certain amount of utility” to each citizen.74 The victim’s consent does
not cleanse a reckless assault of its wrongfulness, nor does it affect the
state’s duty to protect. Thus, Professor Katz concludes that (4) similar to
reckless assault, one cannot alienate oneself from one’s right against
being victimized by insider trading. This is true even if one makes a
voluntary and calculated decision to trade in the shares of a firm that has
made the disclosure quoted above in order to take advantage of “the
pecuniary advantages that flow from investing in a company that allows
insider trading.”75
The flaw in this argument is evident. First, considered from the
standpoint of moral wrongdoing, the “victim” identified by the Law of
Conservation of Securities bears no resemblance to the victim of an
intentional or reckless assault. Recall that the Law of Conservation of
Securities purports that every profitable trade or omission made in
advance of a material disclosure creates “victims.”76 But, while the
wrongfulness of any assault is self-evident, no one would suggest that
all profitable trades or omissions made in advance of a material disclo-
sure are wrongful; and certainly no one suggests that market participants
possess an inalienable right against all such profitable trades. In short, at
a minimum, Professor Katz’s argument outlined above fails to appreci-
ate that the Law of Conservation of Securities is egregiously overinclu-
sive as a criterion for identifying the moral permissibility of trading.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 218.
72. See id. at 226.
73. See id. at 224.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 226.
76. See supra Part IV.
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Second, imagine the practical consequences of recognizing an inalien-
able right to government protection from the purported “harm” identi-
fied by the Law of Conservation of Securities. The only way to protect
against all profitable trades or omissions in advance of market-moving
events would be to close the markets. To avoid this absurdity, it must be
admitted that the Law of Conservation of Securities—considered in iso-
lation—offers no barrier to shareholders and potential shareholders con-
senting to issuer-licensed insider trading.77 In sum, even if Professor
Katz is correct that there are some wrongs that consent cannot cleanse,78
without more, the mere inducement or preemption identified by the Law
of Conservation of Securities does not rank among them.
In fairness, Professor Katz does not describe the situation precisely
as I have. When expressly addressing the case of issuer-licensed insider
trading, he offers the following hypothetical:
Bertram and Cuthbert are both entrepreneurs. One day Bertram who
has not yet done any business with Cuthbert asks to invest in a com-
pany Cuthbert happens to be running. Cuthbert is a bit reluctant to let
him. The reason, he explains to Bertram, is that he is often seized by
the urge to purchase additional stock in his own company from other
investors but is apt not to tell them certain material facts that have
triggered such an impulse in him (like the discovery of an oilfield),
facts that would probably affect their decision to sell. In other words,
he is worried that he might go so far as to buy stock from Bertram,
which the latter if he had knowledge of all the facts would not con-
sent to sell him. He, Cuthbert, would then be guilty of defrauding
someone to whom he owes a fiduciary obligation. Bertram declares
that he is willing to shoulder that risk. . . . Cuthbert makes a proposal.
It provides that in case Cuthbert should recklessly purchase stock
from Bertram without disclosing a material fact, the latter waives his
right to complain about fraud. Nevertheless, just to make sure that
Cuthbert still makes a good faith effort to watch his step, he shall in
such cases be liable to Bertram for a specified sum of damages, let us
say $1,000.79
Assume that Cuthbert subsequently agrees to purchase shares from Ber-
tram over dinner one night without disclosing nonpublic information
that Cuthbert estimates has a seventy percent chance of being material.
Professor Katz argues that Bertram should still be able to press charges
against Cuthbert despite their agreement because one’s right against
being defrauded is inalienable and cannot be exchanged for some liqui-
77. As noted supra Part IV, even Professor Wang admits that the Law of Conservation of
Securities is overinclusive as a criterion for moral permissibility or regulation. See Wang, Stock
Market Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 36.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74. R
79. Katz, supra note 7, at 225. R
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dated damage clause.80 Now, “[r]eplace the dinner table with the stock
exchange and the $1,000 fee with the pecuniary advantages that flow
from investing in a company that allows insider trading and you have the
canonical case.”81 But there is a crucial, and somewhat obvious, asym-
metry between Katz’s hypothetical and a market that openly allows for
issuer-licensed insider trading.
Recall the disclosure that Professor Katz imagines an issuer permit-
ting insider trading might make: “THIS COMPANY BELIEVES IN
LETTING ITS INSIDERS TRADE ON THE BASIS OF INSIDE
INFORMATION. IF THIS BOTHERS YOU, DON’T BUY OUR
STOCK.”82 These terms bear little resemblance to the hypothetical
agreement between Bertram and Cuthbert. In the latter agreement, Ber-
tram exacts from Cuthbert the promise not to trade on material nonpub-
lic information and includes a liquidated damages clause in the event
that he does.83 In other words, when Cuthbert trades with Bertram based
on material nonpublic information, he breaches the terms of his contrac-
tual relationship. Professor Katz therefore builds the fraud into his
hypothetical.
But imagine Cuthbert negotiated a clause in his contract with Ber-
tram that expressly grants Cuthbert the right to make trades in his com-
pany’s shares based on material nonpublic information. Assume also
that Bertram agreed to this clause because he is aware of “the pecuniary
advantages that flow from investing in a company that allows insider
trading.”84 This revision changes the circumstances dramatically. There
would no longer be any basis for the claim that Cuthbert fraudulently
deceived Bertram in the subsequent trade. In short, when Cuthbert
makes the disclosure Professor Katz himself suggests that a firm permit-
ting insider trading would make, the fraud (and therefore the moral
wrong) falls away. And once the fraud falls away, so too does any claim
that Bertram retains an inalienable right against Cuthbert’s trade. The
result is that once Professor Katz’s example is modified to achieve true
symmetry with issuer-licensed insider trading, it helps to illustrate the
moral permissibility of such trading, not refute it.
80. Id. at 226.
81. Id. In other words, Professor Katz is suggesting that just like the $1,000 liquidated
damages clause does not exculpate the wrong in Cuthbert’s fraud (and therefore cannot deprive
Bertram of his right to legal protection against that fraud), neither do the pecuniary benefits that
flow from issuer-licensed insider trading to shareholders (e.g., improved price accuracy, delivery
of real-time information to the markets, market-smoothing effect, efficient compensation of firm
executives, etc.) exculpate the wrong inherent in such trading nor absolve the state of its duty to
protect shareholders against it.
82. Id. at 219.
83. See id. at 225.
84. Id. at 226.
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In sum, Professor Katz’s argument that traders cannot consent to
insider trading is fallacious for one of the following two reasons: (1) It
relies on a misunderstanding of the “harm” identified by the Law of
Conservation of Securities; or (2) it mischaracterizes the relationship
between the issuer that openly permits insider trading and its sharehold-
ers, or its potential shareholders, to assume the fraud—and consequent
inalienability—that must be proven.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Law of Conservation of Securities either proves too much or
too little. It either shows that every profitable trade or omission prior to a
material disclosure results in a harm or victimization that should be con-
sidered in determining whether criminal liability is warranted—which is
a fantastic claim—or it identifies a trivial truth that is not helpful in
addressing the question of whether issuer-licensed insider trading is
wrong or should be regulated. This law is therefore a non-factor in ana-
lyzing the moral permissibility of issuer-licensed insider trading. Neu-
tralizing the Law of Conservation of Securities in turn has consequences
for other arguments against issuer-licensed insider trading that rely upon
it. The failure of Professor Katz’s inalienability argument provides an
example.
In sum, I have offered a number of arguments for the conclusion
that issuer-licensed insider trading is morally permissible and should not
be criminalized. Perhaps these arguments are mistaken; but if they are, it
is not because they fail to account for some harm or victim identified by
Professor Wang’s Law of Conservation of Securities, nor is it because
Professor Katz has shown that all traders hold an inalienable right
against issuer-licensed insider trading.
